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On July  1,  1968,  the  last  tariff barriers  between  the  six 
member states of the European Economic Community were 
removed. Tariffs and quotas, the traditional instruments of 
mercantilism,  trade wars  and the quest for  national self-
sufficiency, disappeared. Labour and capital can now move 
freely  within the Community. National markets which for 
decades were  self-contained are becoming increasingly ex-
posed  to  competition,  as  new  competitors  emerge  in the 
member states and as competitors from outside the Com-
munity seek to profit from the opportunities offered by the 
large European market. 
An additional factor has been the speeding up of  technical 
progress, reflected in a shortening of the time-span between 
the moment of  innovation and that of  industrial application. 
In the nineteenth century it took about 100 years from the 
discovery of the principle of the steam engine to its com-
mercial application. For the telephone and photography it 
took about 50 years. The time-lag in our era has shortened 
to five years for the splitting of the atom and for cybernetics 
.nd  to three years for semi-conductors. 
The Community's competition policy should take account 
of modern technical developments and their impact on the 
Common Market's economy. Its competition policy must be 
more  than  a  mere  "anti-trust",  policy  whether  directed 
against restrictive agreements or monopolies. True, bans on 
restrictive  agreements and on abuses of dominant market 
positions  provided  for  by  the  Common  Market rules  of 
competition are important and permanent components of 
competition policy. Care must be taken that the actions of 
firms  or governments do not undo the Commission's aims 
and achievements in freeing trade from the artificial barriers 
and distortions  set  up by. restraints  of competition.  Con-
sumers and businessmen alike expect the Common Market 
to improve living standards.  This expectation, in addition 
to  the  political  desire  for  European unification,  was  one 
of the  main  motivations  for  concluding  the  Community 
Treaties. 
But  our hopes  will  not be  fulfilled  unless  firms  in the 
Common Market really compete with each other as tariff, 
tax and legal  barriers to the formation  of a  single  home 
market are gradually removed. Only competition can ensure 
optimum use of the factors of production, maintenance and 
strengthening of European firms' competitiveness on world 
•
arkets and - beyond the purely economic objectives - the 
feguarding of freedom in a way consistent with the Com-
munity's social objectives. 
The Commission's record 
The  Commission  is  determined  to  apply  the  bans  on 
restraints of competition whenever the need arises. It made 
this clear in July 1969 when in two cases it imposed heavy 
fines under Article 85 of  the Rome Treaty, which deals with 
infringement  of the  rules  of competition.  One  decision 
related to the international quinine agreement, the other to 
concerted price-fixing for aniline dyestuffs by manufacturers 
from the Community and two non-member countries (see 
Annex 1). 
The instruments of Community competition policy -- the 
ban on restrictive  agreements  and prohibition of abuse -
correspond to those provided by American anti-trust law. 
The mere pursuit of a "prohibition policy" would, however, 
not enable  the  Commission  to cope  adequately  with  the 
actual situation of firms in the Common Market. The inte-
gration process and technological progress require firms to 
make far-reaching adjustments almost daily.  Even  the re-
organization of entire industries may be needed. 
The second important task of those in charge of Com-
munity competition policy is therefore to help firms to adapt 
themselves.  It is  not  the  Commission's  task  to  force  a 
company's  management  to  take  measures  of adaptation. 
Nor is it our task to arrange cooperation between firms  or 
to help finance  adaptation investment. We must use other 
means  of  helping  firms  to  bring  about  the  necessary 
adaptation. 
Policy on restrictive agreements 
One  of the ways  in which  a firm  can adapt itself to new 
market conditions is  by cooperating with other firms.  Co-
operation may, to quote a few examples only, take the form 
of specialization  agreements,  joint  purchasing  or  selling 
arrangements, joint research and development, and licensing 
or exclusive-dealing agreements (see Annex 2). 
The European Treaties' rules of competition apply to all 
these forms of cooperation. The rules forbid as a matter of 
principle all  restraints  of competition which  impair trade 
between member states; but they exempt forms of  coopera-
tion whose overall economic effects are likely to be beneficial. 
Obviously the opportunities for adaptation made available 
to firms through cooperation depend on how these rules are 
interpreted  and  applied.  Here  competition  policy  must 
provide assistance wherever it is required and justified. 
The Community's competition policy should be based on 
an approach consistent with economic reality. ·It would be 
inconsistent with current economic conditions in Europe if 
3 we held that every reduction in the number of  independently 
operating firms necessarily entailed less competition. From 
the angle of pure logic, this theory looks convincing, but it 
is not compatible with the current structure of  many econo-
mic  sectors in the Community.  Agriculture is  an obvious 
example, but so are retail trade or those markets where many 
small firms vie with a few giants. In such a situation small 
firms, if operating independently, may be too small to matter 
to the big companies; but cooperation may enable them to 
challenge their powerful rivals. 
Here  is  a  practical  example  from  the  Commission's 
experience.  Europe's marine-paint market is  shared by the 
big  international  groups  and  a  large  number  of small 
manufacturers. The big groups operate sales agencies in all 
major ports, so that the purchaser can be offered the same 
product everywhere. This selling point, of great importance 
for paint repair work for instance, is  not available to the 
small  manufacturers  and  so  their  ability  to  compete  is 
restricted. As a result, a number of small firms from several 
countries thought of offsetting this disadvantage by jointly 
developing paints, laying down quality standards and selling 
under the same trade mark. This project should transform 
small firms of merely local importance into serious compe-
titors for the international groups; the Commission accord-
ingly authorized it because it expects that it will bring keener 
competition. 
Eff ct on market 
This example shows how our assessment of  various forms of 
cooperation depends on the effect the agreements are likely 
to have on actual market trends. An agreement's effects on 
the market may vary fundamentally according to the market 
context. For this reason we feel that mere knowledge of the 
terms of an agreement is not a sufficient basis for a decision 
on the application of  the Community's rules of  competition. 
Market analysis is  essential to a  Community competition 
policy. 
A predominantly economic approach such as  this must 
influence the definition of "restraint of competition" and 
consequently  the  scope  of Community law  on restrictive 
agreements. If  the effect of an agreement on the market is 
what matters, it stands to reason that the rules of competi-
tion  should  apply  only  to  agreements  that  appreciably 
influence market conditions. Accordingly, the Commission 
concentrates on the really important cases. This approach is 
also in the interest of firms  in the Common Market, and 
particularly for the large number of small firms.  But it also 
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benefits the economy as a whole, since concentration of the 
Community's work on a smaller number of cases facilitates 
the development of case-law. 
At present firms are entitled to know as soon as possible 
what Community competition law prohibits and permits -
what is  clearly  forbidden,  and what may  conceivably  be 
authorized. 
We  are  trying to clarify  our competition policy in two 
ways.  We  devoted  the  first  few  years  after  Community 
competition law came into force mainly to laying the founda-
tions  by  passing  implementing  provisions.  We  are  now 
trying  to increase  each  year  the number of decisions  on 
different  kinds  of restrictive  agreements;  more  decisions 
were issued in 1968 than in any previous year since the start 
of European integration. We choose particular cases so that 
a decision on them clarifies the situation for the greatest pos-
sible number of similar cases. An example of this working 
method  is  the  recent  Commission  decision  on  exclusive 
dealing agreements. This has made it possible to settle by a 
simplified procedure another 1,100 agreements which hav. 
been notified to the Commission. The decision also clarifies 
how exclusive-dealing agreements for sales in non-member 
countries are to be legally assessed in the future. 
Bloc exemptions 
The  second  way  the  Commission  is  trying  to  clarify  its 
competition policy is based on the possibility, provided by 
the EEC Treaty, of  granting block exemptions from the ban 
on  restrictive  agreements.  The  Commission  has  already 
granted  a  bloc  exemption  for  certain  exclusive-dealing 
agreements, and we shall try to do the same for other forms 
of cooperation. We are now considering the possibility of 
granting bloc exemptions for agreements on 
•  uniform use of standards or types; 
•  research and development; 
•  specialization; 
• joint buying or selling, and 
•  certain licensing agreements. 
We are considering whether the Commission could facili-
tate the conclusion of such agreements by withdrawing the 
notification requirement.  We  are also trying to find  out if 
general criteria can be established to determine whether a 
restraint is  "appreciable"; this would enable the Commis-
sion  to  adopt  regulations  that  would  exclude  cases  of 
negligible restraint from the scope of  the rules of  com petitio. 
This  work  is  running  into  great  difficulties.  No expe 
rience is yet available on the effects of  such general measures on agreements  of the  kinds just described.  It is  proving 
extremely  difficult  to  formulate  general  rules  exempting 
certain forms of  cooperation that are comprehensive enough 
to make exemption a meaningful proposition and yet not so 
comprehensive  as  to  include  agreements  which  do  not 
justify exemption. 
This is a new area of  the law on restrictive agreements. We 
have moved into it because traditional policy cannot ade-
quately handle today's situation in the Common Market. 
Pressures of technological and other developments compel 
European business  to seek  out new  methods of research, 
production  and  marketing  and  Community  competition 
policy to break new ground. 
Policy on mergers 
Our policy on industrial mergers is determined by our con-
cept of the future  structure of European business. It also 
depends, of course, on the legal opportunities provided for 
the Commission under the European Treaties. 
The  structures  of European  markets  must  satisfy  two 
.onditions. There should be  enough independent firms  to 
ensure  effective  competition.  At the  same  time,  however, 
these  firms  should be  large  enough to solve  problems  of 
research, production and marketing. Each firm must decide 
for itself whether to seek the right scale of  operations through 
internal growth or through amalgamations.  In any event, 
since  the  beginning  of European  integration  a  steadily 
increasing number of firms seem to have been choosing the 
merger method. At present hardly a day passes without the 
press reporting new mergers or merger negotiations. Most of 
these  companies  seem  to  be  responding  to  the  growing 
pressure of  competition on the European and world markets. 
Generally these firms  do not want to restrict competition, 
but to improve their competitiveness  and to adapt them-
selves  to  the  new  scale  of the  market.  In these  cases,  a 
reduction in the number of independent firms can intensify 
competition. Such mergers are in harmony with the object-
ives of Community competition policy for, to use a quota-
tion from  the  United  States  Supreme  Court which  aptly 
describes the Commission's policy,  "It is  competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects." 
Cross-frontier mergers 
At present there are few  mergers  between firms  from dif-
ferent member countries. Most mergers take place between 
Aompanies of  the same nationality, or between a firm from a 
~ember  state  and  a  firm  outside  the  Community.  The 
Commission is working  hard to eliminate  the obstacles -
especially  in the  area of tax and company law - to cross-
frontier  mergers.  Unfortunately,  some  recent  cases  show 
that the governments of some member countries prefer to 
restructure industries in a national framework and therefore 
use pressure to prevent multinational arrangements. 
This trend is a matter of concern. Mergers between firms 
from different member states could speed up the integration 
of markets. In addition, the Common Market, not national 
frontiers,  should be the framework for the development of 
new  market structures.  If a  firm  wants  to combine  with 
another firm to boost its productivity, it should in general be 
able  to  choose  the  partner  whose  production  range  or 
marketing  system  makes  the  best  match.  The  economic 
success of the Community depends on optimum allocation 
of the factors of production. 
In a few industries, however, additional mergers between 
certain firms  would  endanger workable  competition.  The 
European Treaties bind the Community to act if  competition 
is distorted. We construe Article 86 of  the EEC Treaty, which 
prohibits "the abuse of a dominant position", to mean that 
a merger which eliminates effective competition constitutes 
a case of abuse and is consequently prohibited. 
At present, as  national markets are more and more ex-
posed  to  competition,  including  competition  from  firms 
outside the Community, workable competition is threatened 
on only a few markets. Thus the Commission has so far had 
no occasion to apply Article 86 to a merger. 
The Commission is in a stronger position over mergers in 
the coal and steel industry, because the European Coal and 
Steel  Community  Treaty  allows  them  only  if they  are 
authorized by the Commission. 
As these industries are passing through a period of struc-
tural reform, we  have in the past endorsed most plans for 
cooperation and concentration. But we realize that the main-
tenance of effective competition between a small number of 
competitors in the coal and steel industries -particularly the 
latter-will pose an increasingly difficult problem. 
Conclusion 
Our aim is to make the Community's economy strong and 
efficient. The European Economic Community has provided 
us  with  a  great opportunity to achieve  this  objective.  As 
integration spreads to an ever larger number of markets, it 
releases stimuli which can have a creative effect,  provided 
the free play of  market forces is safeguarded. This is why the 
task of ensuring free and undistorted competition has a key 
position in the European Treaties. Those in charge of the 
Community's competition policy  bear the great responsi-
bility for accomplishing this task. 
5 Annex 1:  Commission's 
first fines for violation of 
the rules of competition 
The  Commission in July  1969  imposed its first  fines  ever 
under  the  Economic  Community's  anti-trust  law.  They 
totalled  nearly  $1  million,  and  affected  two  major 
cartels. 
One  concerned  the  six  major quinine  producers  in the 
Community,  all  members  of the  "International  Quinine 
Agreement". The other concerned a group of ten dyestuffs 
producers,  four  of them  with  headquarters  outside  the 
Community. Most of the firms have already appealed to the 
Community's Court of Justice. 
Quinine cartel 
The agreement between the quinine producers, held by the 
Commission to be restrictive, concerned six companies hold-
ing a dominant position on the European and world quinine 
markets.  It covered  the  manufacture  and  distribution  of 
quinine used by  the pharmaceuticals and food  industries, 
and quinidine, a drug used to treat heart diseases. 
The parties to the agreement were the Dutch company, 
Nederlandse  Combinatie  voor  Chemische  Industrie  NV 
(Nedchem),  fined.  $210,000;  two  German  companies, 
Boehringer Mannheim GmbH and Buchler und Co, fined 
respectively $190,000 and $65,000;  and three French com-
panies,  Societe  Chimique  Pointed-Girard  SA  and Societe 
Nogentaise de Produits Chimiques, each fined $12,500, and 
Pharmacie Centrale de France, fined $10,000. The fines were 
set in relation to each company's market position and its 
responsibility for the infringements. 
In 1960,  at the instigation of Nedchem and Boehringer, 
the largest of the six  manufacturers, these companies had 
agreed to coordinate their purchases of raw materials and 
sales  of quinine  on all  markets.  Changes in raw material 
supply in 1962 ended the joint purchasing arrange:ments, but 
the sales  agreements became more important. The manu-
facturers agreed to charge common prices for quinine and 
quinidine in all countries. In 1964 they raised their selling 
price by about 50 per cent, despite some reluctance on the 
part of Nedchem; and these prices were applied by all six 
companies until February 1965. 
The :six  companies  also  agreed  to  protect  their  home 
markets against imports from other member countries and 
established  export  quotas  for  all  countries.  The  French 
companies  were  not permitted to  manufacture  quinidine. 
Article 85(1) of the Common Market Treaty specifically 
outlaws all these practices. The companies involved sought 
and obtained legal advice to this effect,  but continued the 
infringement, took precautions to keep the agreements secret 
' 
and instructed their members to destroy any compromising 
documents. 
From  1965,  market  developments  prevented  the  strict 
application of the agreement.  There  was  a sudden, unex-
pected increase in demand and a shortage of cinchona bark 
from  which  quinine  is  extracted.  The  American  military 
authorities,  who  had  disposed  of most  of their  strategic 
quinine stockpile, reappeared on the market as a large pur-
chaser because of events in Vietnam.  (Quinine is  the only 
remedy  for  certain  types  of malaria.)  As  a  result,  both 
cinchona bark and quinine prices rose. They reached a peak 
in mid-1966,  dropped back to the prices agreed  for early 
1965, and then resumed their climb; the upward trend was 
still continuing in 1969. 
In mid-1966, following a large increase in the selling price 
to the United States, the U.S. Senate Anti-trust Monopolies 
Subcommittee held hearings. After publication of the Sub-
committee's  findings  in  1967,  the  European  Commission 
opened its investigation of the companies headquartered in 
the Community; it was  this investigation which led to the 
imposition of the fines in July 1969. 
Dyestuffs cartel 
The  Commission's  investigations  into  the  second  cartel, 
composed of  ten major dyestuffs manufacturers, was started 
on the basis of information supplied by trade organizations 
of industrial users.  They disclosed that the manufacturers 
had made uniform and virtually simultaneous price increases 
in January 1964, January 1965, and October 1967. 
The companies are: Badische Anilin-und Soda-fabrik AG 
(BASF),  Casella  Farbwerke  Mainkur  AG,  and  Farben-
fabriken Bayer AG, all of Germany; Societe francaise des 
matieres  colorantes  SA  (Francolor)  of France;  Aziende 
Colori Nazionali Affini Spa (ACNA) of  Italy; SA Ciba, J.R. 
Geigy SA, and Sandoz SA, all of Switzerland, and Imperial 
Chemical  Industries  Ltd  (ICI)  of the  United  Kingdom. 
Together these  companies account for 80  per cent  of the 
Community dyestuffs market. 
All but ACNA were fined $50,000. ACNA was penalized 
less  heavily  because  it  was  not party  to  the  1965  price 
increase and because it was instrumental in preventing the 
increase planned in 1967 from being applied on the Italian 
market. 
The  Commission  said  the  price-fixing  agreement  had 
restricted trade within the Community by: 
•  covering all  products imported and sold in Community 
countries  by  these  companies,  their  subsidiaries  and 
representatives. 
• preventing users from gaining anything by importing from 
suppliers in other member countries, since prices on their 
home markets increased at the same rate and on the same 
date in other countries. 
It held the parent companies,  not their  subsidiaries o. 
representatives,  responsible for  the violation of the Com- , 
munity's competition rules. Annex 2: Commission's 
criteria for permissible 
business agreements 
In a  statement defining its policy on trading and research 
agreements between firms  in the Six,  the Commission an-
nounced in July 1968 that it welcomed cooperation among 
small and medium-sized companies if this enabled them to 
work more rationally and increase their productivity and 
competitiveness on a  larger market. It considered the en-
couragement of cooperation of this kind as part of its task. 
Cooperation among large  firms  could  also,  in the  Com-
mission's view,  be economically justifiable and compatible 
with the Community's competition policy. 
The  Commission  authorizes  agreements  if  the  total 
market share of the participating companies is too small to 
cause an appreciable restraint of  competition in the Common 
Market or to hamper trade between the member states. The 
Commission does not specify the permissible share of the 
market which may be involved; this depends on a number of 
factors, including the nature of the industry and products 
involved, and the availability of substitutes for the products 
concerned. 
Although the Treaties' rules on preventing distortion of 
competition are becoming more important as economic inte-
gration  of member  states  advances,  it is  also  becoming 
crucial for firms to adapt themselves to the Common Market 
and to keener competition on world markets.  One major 
way in which adaptation can be facilitated is by cooperation 
between firms. To encourage this, and to dispel uncertainty 
about its positive attitude, the Commission statement set out 
the forms of cooperation between firms which in its opinion 
do not contravene  Article  85(1)  of the  EEC Treaty  and 
Article  65(1)  of the  ECSC  Treaty.  The  statement  was 
intended to make it easier for businessmen to know which 
agreements do not need to be notified to the Commission for 
"negative clearance". 
Eight types 
In interpreting and applying the provisions of the Paris and 
Rome Treaties on competition, the Commission regards the 
following eight categories of agreement as permissible: 
1. Agreements whose sole object is an exchange of opinion or 
experience;  joint  market  research;  joint  preparation  of 
statistics and calculation models. 
There may, however,  be a  restraint of competition where 
concrete recommendations are made, or where conclusions 
....  'n  nduce at least some of  the firms to behave identically on the 
.arket. Where  there  are  special  intermediary  bodies  to 
·  register orders, turnover, investment and prices, it would be 
wrong to assume automatically that the rules of  the Treaties 
are  waived,  particularly  on  an  oligopolistic  market  for 
similar products. 
2. Agreements whose sole object is cooperation in accounting; 
joint provision of credit guarantees; joint debt-collecting as-
sociations; joint business or tax-consultancy agencies. 
The  Commission  stated  that  debt-collecting  associations 
which  also  fix  or influence  prices  may,  however,  restrict 
competition. Application of uniform conditions by all parti-
cipating firms and joint comparison of prices could consti-
tute cases of concerted practices. The use of standardized 
printed forms must not be combined with an understanding 
or tacit agreement on uniform prices, rebates or conditions 
of sale. 
3. Agreements whose sole object is the joint implementation, 
placing and sharing out of research and development projects 
among the participating firms. 
The mere exchange of research experience and results, the 
Commission stated, serves for information only and does not 
restrict competition. It therefore  need  not be  mentioned 
expressly. If, however, firms restrict their own research and 
development (R&D) activity or the use of  the results of  joint 
work so that they do not have a free hand for R & D outside 
the joint projects, this can constitute an infringement of the 
rules of competition. 
Where firms do not carry out joint research work, con-
tractual obligations or concerted practices binding them to 
refrain from research work of their own, either completely 
or in certain sectors, may result in a restraint of  competition. 
The sharing out of sectors of research without an under-
standing providing for mutual access  to the results is  re-
garded as a case of specialization that may restrict competi-
tion. So too are undertakings to manufacture only products 
developed jointly. 
There may also  be a  restraint of competition if certain 
participating firms are excluded from the exploitation of the 
results,  either entirely or to an extent not commensurate 
with their participation, or if  the granting of  licences to non-
participants is expressly or tacitly excluded. 
4. Agreements whose only object is the joint use of production 
facilities, of storage facilities and of transport equipment. 
There  may  be a  restraint of competition if the firms  go 
beyond organizational and technical arrangements and agree 
on joint production. 
5. Agreements whose sole object is the setting up of working 
partnerships for the common execution of orders, where the 
participating firms  do  not compete with each other over the 
work to be done, or where each of them by itself is unable to 
execute the orders. 
If, however, the absence of  competition is based on concerted 
practices, there may be a restraint of  competition. Where the 
firms  participating in an association do normally compete 
with each other, there is no restraint of competition if the 
firms cannot execute the specific order by themselves because 
they lack experience, specialized knowledge, adequate capa-
7 city or financial resources. Nor is there a restraint of  compe-
tition if  it is only by setting up an association that the firms 
can make  a  promising  offer.  There  may,  however,  be  a 
restraint of  competition if  the firms undertake to work solely 
in the framework of an association. 
6. Agreements whose sole object is joint selling arrangements 
or joint after-sales and repair service, provided the partici-
pating firms are not competitors over the products or services 
covered by the agreement. 
The Commission pointed out that often small or medium-
sized firms competing with each other sell jointly, but that 
this does not entail an appreciable restraint of competition. 
"'!. Agreements whose sole object is joint advertising. 
If  the agreement prevents the participants from themselves 
advertising, there may be a restraint of competition. 
8. Agreements whose sole object is the use of a common label 
to designate a certain quality, where the label is available to all 
competitors on the same conditions. 
There may be restraint of competition if the right to use the 
label is linked to obligations regarding production, market-
ing or price formation, for instance when the participants 
are obliged to manufacture or sell only products of guaran-
teed quality. 
Dominant positions 
The  statement  added  that  the  Commission  intended  to 
establish, by means of suitable decisions in individual cases 
or by general notices, the status of the various forms of co-
operation in relation to the provisions of the Rome Treaty. 
But it could not at that time make a general statement on the 
application of the Rome and Paris Treaties to the abuse of 
dominant positions within the Common Market or within a 
part of it. 
As a general rule, firms need no longer apply to the Com-
mission for negative clearance for the eight types of agree-
ments listed. Nor should it be necessary for the legal situa-
tion to be clarified through a Commission decision on an 
individual case. This means that notification will no longer 
be necessary for agreements of this type. In cases of doubt 
firms are free to apply for negative clearance. 
Specific cases 
The Commission statement cited three recent cases in which 
it approved the agreements involved, and which illustrate the 
principles  underlying its  attitude  to cooperation  between 
firms. 
1. Alliance de Constructeurs fran~ais de Macbines-outils 
The aim of this  agreement is  to create  a joint exporting 
service for the company's nine members, and the Alliance's 
sole  activity is  business negotiation.  The members  of the 
Alliance are small and medium-sized firms. Their total turn-
over accounts for  a  little more than 10  per cent of total 
French output. 
The Commission stated that a joint export service does 
not conflict with the objects of  the EEC Treaty, if  the service 
acts merely as a joint market prospection agency for non-
S 
competing products and does not constitute an intermediate 
stage in distribution. It also took the view that the commit· 
ment by each Alliance member neither to manufacture nor 
to sell machines liable to compete with those manufactured 
by other members did not constitute a restraint of competi-
tion because this was  the formal expression of a  de facto 
situation which already existed before the Alliance was set 
up, and because the market for machine-tools is tending to 
encourage specialization. Furthermore, the members repre-
sented  only  an insignificant  part of the  EEC market for 
machine-tools.  These  three  factors  combined  caused  the 
Commission to issue a negative clearance in this case. 
2. Socemas 
The  Societe  commerciale  et d'Etudes  des  Maisons  d'  Ali-
mentation et d'Approvisionnement a  Succursales (Socemas) 
is a French trading and research company set up to facilitate 
cooperation between about 60  food-retailing chain stores. 
One of its aims is to prospect foreign markets in order to 
purchase on favourable terms on behalf of member firms. 
The Commission's approval shows that it regards Article 
85  of the  Treaty  as  applicable  to  agreements  between 
purchasers in the same way as the Article is to those between 
sellers. Negative clearance was granted because the activity 
of  SOCEMAS in EEC countries other than France was not on a 
sufficiently  large  scale  to  entail  appreciable  restraints  of 
competition. An additional factor was that its activity has 
not increased in recent years. 
This  decision  represented  a  first  step  towards  solving 
problems  of competition  related  to  cooperation  between 
firms engaged in trading. 
3. ACEC-Berliet 
The aim of this joint research and development agreement 
between  S.A.  Ateliers  de  Constructions  Electriques  de 
Charleroi (ACEC), of Brussels, and the Societe Automobile 
Berliet, of Lyons, is the design and marketing of a new type 
of bus with an electrical transmission system. 
When a marketable prototype has been designed under the 
cooperation  arrangements,  it  is  agreed  that  ACEC  will 
supply  the  electrical  transmission  system  and Berliet  the 
mechanical parts of the vehicles.  In the Common Market, 
however,  ACEC  will  be  free  to  deliver  its  transmission 
systems to only one manufacturer in each of the four other 
member countries, in addition to Berliet in France and to 
Belgian users. 
The  Commission  accepted  this ·agreement,  although  it 
contains certain restraints of competition, because it consi-
dered  the restraints  indispensable  to  obtain economically 
desirable  results  from  the agreement - in particular,  im-
proved production and technical progress. The exemption 
from the Rome Treaty ban was for five years. 
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